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Women and the Equal Protection Clause
Eric R. Gilbertson*
Frailty, thy name is woman.
Shakespeare, Antony Act I, Scene 2
O R IS IT? Members of women's movements and advocates of current
feminist thought would have us think otherwise. Today, perhaps
even the most confirmed male "chauvinist" would be hard pressed to
deny that Western culture has, historically, advanced what might most
delicately be termed a "protective" view of this allegedly oppressed
majority. Be that as it may, whether the product of a benign, paternalis-
tic fondness, or a latent, all-pervading attitude of sexual supremacy, such
pejorative concepts as the "dumb broad" stereotype may no longer be
safely employed in mixed company.
The stance of the law in this respect, as with other social trends, has
generally reflected the current attitudes that dominate the society it gov-
erns. Yet, as late as 1969, we still had judges on the appellate level tak-
ing judicial notice of the female's lesser capacity for sexual arousal, the
sexual behavior of "the vast majority of women in a civilized society,"
and the "normal" behavior of a married woman in the presence of her
husband in their bedroom;' all in a puritanically paternalistic fashion.
This, and other absurd judicial pronouncements may have been what
prompted one controversial attorney to observe that "all ostriches do not
have feathers and a beak." 2
Equal Protection???
Opponents of legislation designed specifically to insure to women an
equal status before the law most often point to the "equal protection"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as rendering the same unnecessary.
The essence of the protection afforded by this provision is, of course, the
prohibition against the arbitrary and unreasonable classification of per-
sons and groups, so as to grant or deny rights or privileges without ra-
tional justification.3
The rule has long provided that as long as a classification is reason-
able and in keeping with a valid legislative purpose, it does not violate
* Of the Ohio Bar; Law Clerk to Justice Robert M. Duncan of the Ohio Supreme
Court.
1 Youngstown v. DeLoretto, 19 Ohio App.2d 267, 281; 251 N.E.2d 491 (1969).
2 Kunstler, A New Challenge to Our Court System; The Spirited Lawyer Represent-
ing Political Defendants, 16 Student Lawyer J. 4, 6 (Dec. 1970).
3 See generally, Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954); New York Rapid
Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1937); Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S.
400 (1909).
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the mandates of the constitution.4 Where problems have arisen, however,
is in the judicial determination of what legislation can, justifiably, classi-
fy women as a distinct group; and do so on a rational, enlightened basis.
A study of these decisions must, sadly, conclude that women have indeed
been the subjects of, what has been at best, overprotection, and at worst,
repression.
Examples of protective regulation are most obvious in the area of
occupational legislation. Minimum wage laws have been enacted for the
benefit of women only, yet have been held not violative of the equal pro-
tection rights of men.5 Further, legislation restricting the number of
hours that an employer can allow, much less compel a woman to work,
have also been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. 6
The not altogether unexpected rationale and justification for the
distinctions drawn was perhaps best expressed by the late Chief Justice
Hughes in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,7 when he wrote that nothing
"could be closer to the public interest than the health of women and
their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching employers."
The same benevolent instincts were expressed in the case of W. C.
Ritchie v. Wayman,s when that court stated:
As weakly and sickly women cannot be the mothers of vigorous
children, it is of the greatest importance to the public that the state
take such measures as may be necessary to protect its women from
the consequences induced by long, continuous manual labor....
The public interest in "its women" was protected; chivalry perhaps was
not dead.
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Brewer, took a some-
what less restrained view of the "fair sex" in Muller v. Oregon,9 a case
whose dictum would make today's feminist cringe. There, in upholding
a ten hour restriction on a woman's workday, the court noted that a
woman's physical structure and performance of maternal functions place
her at an obvious disadvantage in the "struggle for subsistence." Going
further, they took judicial notice that "history discloses that woman has
has always been dependent upon man," and that
while now the doors of the school room are opened and her oppor-
tunities for acquiring knowledge are great, yet even with that and
4 See generally, e.g., American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900);
Allied Stores of Ohio Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Safeway Stores Inc. v.
Oklahoma Retail Grocers Association, 360 U.S. 334 (1959).
5 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
6 Ex Parte Miller, 162 Cal. 687, 124 P. 427 (1912); W. C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman,
244 Ill. 509, 91 N.E. 695 (1910); Commonwealth v. Riley, 218 Mass. 387, 97 N.E. 367
(1912); Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Withey v. Bloem, 163 Mich. 419, 128
N.W. 913 (1910).
7 Supra, n. 5.
8 W. C. Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, supra, n. 6.
9 Mueller v. Oregon, supra, n. 6.
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the consequent increase of capacity for business affairs it is still true
that in the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor
with her brother.10
Conceding that "doubtless there are individual exceptions," still,
"looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort to maintain an independent
position in life, she is not upon an equality." 11 Should this kindly Judge
ever seek to address a "ban the bra" rally today with these words, he
would likely be made to wish his parents had never met.
Albeit, whether for the insured safety of the unborn, the suppression
of unscrupulous businessmen, or the benign sympathy for women ex-
pressed in Muller, women were, for then at least, safe. The powers that
be (or were, as the case may be), supported by the courts, have histor-
ically been particularly protective in shielding "their women" (how's
that for more latent paternalism) from the evils of the Devil's own brew
-- demon rum!!
It has long been held that the denial of liquor licenses to women did
not violate their rights under the equal protection clause. The reasoning
usually followed the view that, since the regulation of liquor traffic is
a power absolute in the state, such licenses are not granted as a matter
of right to anyone.' 2 Women could thus be excluded without further
excuse, as could, supposedly, anyone. The courts have also upheld bans
on the employment of females in establishments selling liquor,13 and pro-
hibitions against the employment of any woman who was not closely re-
lated to the holder of the license, 14 who might be near to render the
"protective oversight" required by a woman in a bar.15 The grounds of
these such restrictions have usually been based on a judicial determina-
tion that:
the legislature may . . . have concluded that it would be an un-
wholesome influence upon the women themselves, the general pub-
lic, and upon our young people, to permit women to act as bar-
tenders.' 6
In Goesaert v. Cleary,17 a case upholding a Michigan statute barring
the licensing of women as bartenders when such women were not the
10 Id. at 421, 422.
11 Id. at 422.
12 Blair v. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind. 312 (1872); In Re Carragher, 149 Iowa 225, 128 N.W.
352 (1910).
13 Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108 (1904); People v. Case, 153 Mich. 98, 116 N.W. 558
(1908); Ex Parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555, 33 P. 337 (1893).
14 People v. Jemnez, 49 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 739, 121 P.2d 543 (1942); Fitzpatrick v.
Liquor Control Commissioner, 316 Mich. 83, 25 N.W. 2d 118 (1946); Grilli v. City of
Hoboken, 21 N.J. 574, 122 A. 2d 881 (1956); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Anderson v. St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538 (1948).
15 Goesaert v. Cleary, supra, n. 14 at 466, Grilli v. City of Hoboken, supra, n. 14.
16 People v. Jemnez supra, n. 14 at 545.
17 Goesaert v. Cleary, supra n. 14.
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wife or daughter of the male proprietor of the bar, Justice Frankfurter,
in a moment of candor, penned these immortal words:
The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men
have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices
that men have long practiced, does not preclude the state from draw-
ing sharp lines between the sexes, certainly, in such matters as the
regulation of liquor traffic.-"
Writhing members of today's movement will not be placated to any de-
gree by his further observation that "since the line ... drawn is not with-
out reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse be-
hind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to
monopolize this calling." 19 Doubtless, the three dissents to this opinion
will be of little comfort to disturbed feminists, whose arguments the
majority "could not give ear to."
It may even be felt in some quarters that even such enlightened de-
cisions as one striking down a prohibition against women becoming taxi-
cab drivers,20 or one decreeing that women may not be excluded from all
public employment by mere virtue of their being married 21 will not com-
pensate, or appease women for the above setbacks, or for those cases
holding that women may be prohibited from working in restaurants be-
tween given hours,22 or upholding a State's denial of the right to prac-
tice law by reason of sex.23 One Supreme Court decision on this latter
point relegated the power to the State in question to determine whether
or not the word "person," as used in its statute, was to be defined so as
to include women in the practice of law. The practice, it was noted, was
not a privilege or immunity of citizenship,24 and could thus be wantonly
granted or denied; again, with no further justification.
The motives for the legislation are unclear, yet they are allowed to
go virtually unquestioned. Motives notwithstanding, the restrictions and
classifications they were based on were allowed to stand.
Restrictions on Public Involvement and Behavior
Patent discrimination may also be historically traced through the
statutory exclusion of women from the polls and jurybox. It required
the passage of the nineteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution to grant suffrage to women, since even the equal protection clause
18 Id. at 466.
19 Id. at 467.
20 State ex rel. v. McCune, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 77, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 185 (1928).
21 In Re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 22 N.E.2d 49 (1939).
22 People v. Gobeo, 6 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1938).
23 In Re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); see also Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130
(1872).
24 In re Lockwood, supra n. 23.
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of the fourteenth amendment was held not to have made the right to
vote co-extensive with citizenship.25
The nineteenth amendment did not, however, grant women the right
to sit in the jurybox. 26 It has been ruled that women had no constitu-
tional right at all to sit on juries. Should the states, however, in their
generosity, see fit to so allow them, the courts found that the constitution
would not prohibit such action.
27
In defense of this stance, a Florida court reasoned that men would
not be less fair to women defendants by denying them equal protection
of the laws. Quite the contrary, they noted, "The spirit of chivalry, and
of deep respect for the rights of the opposite sex, have not yet departed
from the heads and hearts of the men of this country." 28
A 1961 Supreme Court decision also upheld an absolute exemption
from jury duty for women so desiring it,29 again, finding some reasoned
grounds for the discrimination by virtue of the differing life functions of
the sexes. In most recent times, however, only two states have remained
stalwart in continuing the exclusion of women from their juries; Missis-
sippi,3s and South Carolina.31 In 1966, a Federal District Court ruled
that a similar statute in Alabama 32 was unconstitutional as violative of
the fourteenth amendment. 33 The highest court in Mississippi though,
has ruled at late as 1967 that that State's ban was not unconstitutional;
and an appeal therefrom was dismissed.3 4
The reasoning set forth for such exclusion suffers from what might
politely be termed vagueness. Perhaps the legislative and judicial phi-
losophy reflected the now questionable wisdom of that best-loved thinker
of the women's liberation movement, Schopenhauer, who once wrote,
concerning women;35
The weakness of their reasoning faculty also explains why women
show more sympathy for the unfortunate than men, . . . and why,
on the contrary, they are inferior to men as regards justice, and less
honorable and conscientious.
25 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1847).
26 In Re Grilli, 110 Misc. 45, 179 N.Y.S. 795 (1920); State v. James, 96 N.J. 132, 114
A. 553 (1921); State v. Mittle, 113 S.E. 335 (S. Car. 1922), diss. 260 U.S. 705 (1922);
Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
27 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 (1946); State v. James, supra, n. 26; Strauder
v. West Virginia, supra, n. 26.
28 Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 S. 392, 401 (1939).
29 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
30 Miss. Code Ann. § 1762 (1942, Recomp. vol. 1956).
31 S.C. Code § 38-52 (1952).
32 Ala. Code Tit. 30 § 21 (1940, Recomp. vol. 1958).
3 White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (ND. Ala. 1966).
s4 Reed v. State, 199 S.2d 803 (Miss. 1967), dis. 390 U.S. 413 (1968).
35 Schopenhauer's famous essay: On Women (philosophical essay).
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I think it a safe observation that one might be ill advised to carry a sign
with the above ascribed words on it on any street today; yet the invid-
ious discrimination it underlies has shown remarkable durability.
The legislated conduct of women seemed designed to hold them up
as paragons of virtue, often prohibiting their mere presence in dens
of iniquity which catered to the liquor trade.36 One, "interesting"
Kentucky case3 7 upheld a remarkable ordinance which forbade women
from remaining in saloons longer than five minutes absent the showing
that such woman was of good repute, sober and orderly, and in the place
with the consent of her husband or parent.
On a more optimistic note, the Kentucky courts have struck down
a statute prohibiting women from loitering, or standing around within
fifty feet of a liquor selling establishment." That should bring sighs of
relief from conscientious women everywhere.
Still another sage court boldly reasoned that since males cannot be
prostitutes (everyone knows that!), a law to place such "fallen women"
in a special home designed for their rehabilitation did not violate their
then dubious rights to equal protection.39 Lest any wayward girls fall
into the trap of such evil life, another attempt was made to keep them,
while under the age of twenty-one, from entering Chinese hotels and
restaurants. This, in the eyes of the courts was too much.40 The reason-
it discriminated against Chinese!
The justification for such restrictions, again, seems vague even when
viewed with an eye towards the inhibitions of society in times past. The
only real conclusion to be drawn is that, in fact, equal protection was
a sham. The courts were prone to uphold the legal enforcement of vir-
tues on women for no better reason than the fact that they were indeed
different. The classification of women with regard to these matters could
have had no other basis.
McSorely's Old Ale House-A Turning Point??
The absurdity of many of the judicial positions documented above
had given rise to the considered speculation 41 that a dramatic change in
judicial philosophy with regard to this issue was in the offing. After all,
keeping one's head in the sand for too long could only result in suffoca-
tion. Such a turnabout, or, if you please, an awakening, may have had its
36 Supra n. 13.
37 Commonwealth v. Price, 123 Ky. 163, 94 S.W. 32 (1906).
38 Gasteneau v. Commonwealth, 108 Ky. 473, 56 S.W. 705 (1900).
39 Ex Parte Carey, 57 Cal. App. 297, 207 P. 291 (1922).
40 In Re Opinion of the Justices, 207 Mass. 601, 94 N.E. 558 (1911).
41 Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Life,
48 Neb. L. Rev. 131, 182 (Nov. 1968).
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genesis in the New York Federal District Court case of Seidenberg v.
McSorely's Old Ale House Inc.4 2
The 114 year old traditional practice by that establishment of serv-
ing only male patrons was successfully challenged, on constitutional
grounds, by members of a women's liberation group. In the first opinion
rendered, Judge Tenney overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss,
holding that first, an action seeking an injunction against such practices
was authorized under section 1983, Title 42 of the U.S.C.A., 43 and second
that the granting of a liquor license by the state was sufficient to estab-
lish enough "state action" in that establishment to subject its actions to
the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable discrimination.
In a subsequent decision on the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment,44 Judge Mansfield granted the relief sought, holding that:
Outdated images of bars as dens of coarseness and iniquity and of
women as peculiarly delicate and impressionable creatures in need
of protection from the rough and tumble of unvarnished humanity
will no longer justify sexual separation. 45
Though holding the public accommodations sections of the 1964 Civil
Rights inapplicable to women, the court nonetheless found that discrimi-
nation by sex was wholly unwarranted in this area and further was pro-
hibited without any statute by the equal protection clause. State action
in the granting and renewing of the liquor license made this conduct
public, rather than private, and thus within the purview of the constitu-
tional provisions. By way of response to the Supreme Court's holding in
Goesaert,46 the Judge simply noted that "social mores have not stood still
... since 1948." 47
This is an extension of the concept of what is sufficient state action
to warrant such constitutional limitations to be sure. What is important,
however, is the failure of the court to find any reasonable grounds upon
which women, in these times, can be justifiably excluded from a bar. Not
too big a victory perhaps, but larger when examined in light of past hold-
ings. The application of this reasoning to statutes, the like of which were
previously upheld, would indeed be a gratifying departure from prece-
dent.
Lest we become too enthused, however, with this apparent new en-
lightenment in the courts, we ought to be sobered by the realities of
42 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y, 1969).
43 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, under which civil actions were authorized against
any person, acting under color of state action, who denies another constitutional
rights. 24 U.S.C.A. 1343 (3&4) establishes jurisdiction in civil courts to entertain
such actions.
44 Serdenberg v. McSorely's Old Ale House Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y., 1970).
45 Id. at 606.
46 Goesaert v. Cleary, supra, n. 14.
47 Supra n. 44 at 606.
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other rulings which demonstrate that the whole area can only most op-
timistically be termed one in a state of flux.
In DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., both a state48 and federal49
court ruled that since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 50 does not prohibit
sex discrimination in public accommodations, a hotel bar may continue
to refuse service to unescorted women. There, however, state action was
not alleged by the plaintiffs. It might also be noted that while the fifth
circuit Federal Court of Appeals did prohibit the New Orleans police
from preventing a white woman from patronizing a bar with a pre-
dominantly Black clientele through the use of a vagrancy ordinance (as
had been their custom with regard to this matter), it did so on the
grounds that this was racial discrimination, not sexual, and was thus
covered by the 1964 Act.51 That this practice of exclusion was imposed
only upon white women was not deemed salient by the court.
Another series of cases was concerned with the exclusion of pro-
spective students at state funded colleges and universities by reason of
sex. The most progressive view is that expressed in Kirsten v. Univer-
sity of Virginia.52 That case held that the exclusion of women from the
University's Charlottesville campus, the one recognized as the best aca-
demically of that State's supported schools, violated their rights to the
equal protection of the law. The court then went on to approve that
school's three year plan for phasing into a totally nondiscriminatory
admissions policy.
Another decision held, however, that "... the constitution does not
require that a classification 'keep abreast of the latest' in educational
opinion." 53 In so finding, a Federal District Court in South Carolina up-
held the admission policies of that State's publicly supported Winthrop
College, which had refused the admission of the plaintiffs, who were,
incidently, men, to its student body. This classification was justified,
noted the court, because that school's curriculum was designed to be
"specially helpful to female students," who apparently needed to de-
velop different skills from their male counterparts. In attempting to dis-
tinguish their case from Kirsten, the court interpreted the reasoning of
the latter to hinge on the fact that the school to which those plaintiffs
sought admission was allegedly superior to the ones they could other-
wise have attended.
It is unclear whether or not in so holding, that court implicitly ap-
proved a "separate but equal" program for males and females; but if so,
48 59 Misc. 2nd 383, 298 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1969).
49 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y., 1968).
50 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a (a), 2000e-3(b) (1964).
51 Id.
52 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va., 1970).
53 Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D., S. Car., 1970).
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they might take note that Plessey v. Ferguson5 4 is no longer recognized
as authoritative constitutional law.
Two fairly recent Texas cases held, in a similar discouraging fashion,
that women could be properly excluded from the Agricultural and Me-
chanical College of Texas, also a state supported institution.55 Thus, it
would appear that the results of this particular question must remain
uncertain, with no higher court rendering an actual decision on point. If
a guess is to be ventured, however, the state's right to restrict admis-
sions at its schools on the basis of sex appears to be on solid footing.
Confusion Lingers
Other rights remain unvested, at least with any degree of certainty,
in female citizens. The right to seek civil redress for the loss of the con-
sortium of one's spouse, for example, is still not clearly within the pur-
view of the equal protection guarantees. Though Ohio, 56 for example,
and many other states have recognized this right as one of a constitu-
tional magnitude, other jurisdictions 57 still refuse to accept this view.
Equal employment opportunity within the private sector has not
been held to be within the domain of constitutional rights, but rather has
been guaranteed, on paper at least, by provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.5  Casual observation reveals that earlier writers were correct in
predicting that little drastic change would result from this provision.5 9
Were the state action aspects of the Seidenberg decision extended, pri-
vate employment discrimination would also become a problem of con-
stitutional significance, and perhaps more substantive progress would
result.
Women may still be more favorably treated in excusing themselves
from jury service,60 as again it has recently been reaffirmed that states
may not be compelled to allow them to serve, and that their not serving
would not deprive a defendant of the equal protection of the laws.
54 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
55 Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App., 1960), cert. den. 364 U.S. 517
(1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App., 1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 230
(1958).
56 Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile, Cadillac Inc., 22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230
(1970).
57 E.g. see Miskunas v. Union Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847 (7th cir. 1968) holding
valid Indiana's prohibition against a wife's recovery of damages for loss of consor-
tium of her husband.
58 42 U.S.C.A. 2000 (e) (1964) For a detailed discussion of this section see Kanowitz,
Sex Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 Hastings L. J. 305 (1968).
59 See Murray and Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 Geo. Washington L. Rev. 232, 256 (Dec. 1965); consider also however,
Shpritzer v. Lang, 32 Misc.2d 693, 224 N.Y.S.2d 105; modified 17 A.D.2d 285, 234
N.Y.S.2d 285; aff. 13 N.Y.2d 744, 241 N.Y.S. 869 (1962) ruling unconstitutional an
ordinance prohibiting the promotion of a policewoman to the rank of sergeant.
60 Leighton v. Goodman, 311 F.Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), citing Hoyt v. Florida,
supra n. 29; DeKosenko v. Brandt, 63 Misc.2d 895, 313 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1970); see also
supra n. 30-34.
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Women may also properly be treated with favor in the computation of
social security benefits.6 '
The view, in the courts, of women as dainty and delicate creatures
may have suffered one setback when a Federal Court of Appeals held
that women may not be excluded altogether from juries in federal cases,
even when the subject of the proceedings was of a rather unpleasant,
undelicate nature.62 We have recently, however, reaffirmed the view that
public policy may, indeed, intervene when the "fair sex" does overstep
its bounds and attempt to enter the less feminine occupations. An appel-
late court in New York, in so doing, upheld the denial of a license to
a woman who was seeking to become a professional wrestler6 3 in that
state.
Still another illustration of the confusion is the distinction be-
tween cases holding valid or invalid differing degrees of penalty for the
same crimes; when the degree depends on the sex of the offender. En-
couragement may be drawn from decisions holding that Connecticut stat-
utes which subject female6 4 and minor femaleO5 offenders to a special
farm for indefinite sentences, while their male counterparts can be sub-
jected to shorter definite sentences, are unconstitutional. In the same
vein, though, Maine courts have upheld that State's statute prescribing
a greater penalty for male prison escapees than female escapees; finding
some sort of rationale in the type of confinement they were respectively
subjected to."
Conclusion
If a drastic change is occurring in the courts' view of what is a rea-
sonable classification on the basis of sex, that change has not yet solidi-
fied enough to indicate a positive direction. To prevent too much opti-
mism, courts may periodically issue a decision or two reflecting some
sardonic aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy about women. Exemplary
is a 1970 Idaho decision 67 holding that a statute may, without justification
other than mere administrative expediency, give preferential treatment,
all other factors being equal, to men, in the selection of an administrator
-for an estate.
Thus, while the decisions in Seidenberg and a few other cases yield
hope that judicial heads some day will be lifted out of the sand, for the
present we dare not glibly say: "you've come a long way, baby!"
61 Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591 (2nd cir. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 982
(1968).
62 Abbott v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353 (6th cir. 1969) holding that the automatic exclusion
of all women jurors from a case involving medical malpractice in which the plaintiff
was suffering from cancer in the penis and groin was reversible error.
63 Calzadilla v. Dooley, 29 App. Div.2d 152, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1968).
64 United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F.Supp. 8 (D.Conn. 1968).
65 United States v. Sumrell, 288 F.Supp. 955 (D.Conn. 1968).
66 Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62 (Me. 1970).
67 Schopenhauer supra, n. 35.
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